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Abstract – This paper examines the challenges posed by domestic judicial mechanisms to 
address the liability of natural resources companies for human rights abuses and 
environmentally harmful activities, through the foreign operations of their subsidiaries. It 
explores the conceptual difficulties underlying the notion of liability at national law for 
violating international norms and it highlights current challenges raised by the arguments 
made before the United States Supreme Court in the Kiobel case to stop victims of human 
rights violations from bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute for corporate abuses 
committed in the territory of a foreign state. The paper raises the concern that corporate 
impunity for violation of human rights norms might become justified at national law by 
the difficulty to find sources of international law to hold corporations liable for violation 
of international norms. It finally sheds light on enforcement challenges for establishing 
private rights of action and determining liability of corporate actors, arguing that the 
reluctance of national courts to expand principles of corporate liability and extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for corporate harms might affect long-term reforms to hold natural resources 
companies liable for their abuse of international human rights norms. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary function of human rights norms, as envisaged in the post war 
period, was to protect individuals against abuse by their own, or sometimes 
by other, state entities. That said, it has become clear that many important 
threats to the rights of individuals come not only from states but also from 
non-state actors, including international corporations.  
 While there are established rules to invoke the liability of states for 
their breach of international law obligations1, there is no equivalent to hold 
corporations liable for violating human rights norms. Despite arguments2 
that support direct liability of corporations in areas such as international 
criminal law, the lack of obvious international remedies for human rights 
abuse committed by corporations, means that corporate activities remain 
largely governed by national law, as are the mechanisms to hold them 
                                                
* Solicitor in England and Wales, LL.M (University College London) 2012 
1 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, 
‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd session (23 April-1 
June and 2 July 2001-10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10.   
2 Andrew Clapham, ‘Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to 
Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups’ (2008) 6 J Intl Criminal Justice 899, 925-
926. 
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accountable. The lack of specific fora to bring human rights claims against 
corporations also means that liability for breach of international human 
rights norms is essentially a matter for national courts to deal with.  
 The scale of investments by natural resources companies (‘NRCs’), 
primarily in developing countries, combined with their role in generating 
revenues for host States, is significant of their economic and political 
influence3. Collusion with host governments has resulted in allegations of 
corporate complicity in governmental violations of basic human rights. At 
the same time, impact on the environment and communities surrounding 
their operations have made NRCs particularly prone to lawsuits as the 
principal perpetrator of human rights abuses. 
 This paper evaluates the challenges posed to domestic judicial 
mechanisms to address corporate liability of NRCs for their alleged violation 
of international human rights norms.  
 Part B considers some conceptual difficulties underpinning the notion 
of corporate liability for breach of human rights norms. 
 Part C explores the arguments in the current Kiobel4 case before the 
US Supreme Court5 to illustrate the legal debate underpinning the question 
of corporate liability at national law for violation of human rights norms. 
Kiobel is a case arising from claims under the Alien Tort Statute6 (‘ATS’) 
that Royal Dutch Petroleum (‘Shell’) was complicit with the Nigerian 
government in human rights abuse, including torture, extra-judicial killings 
and crimes against humanity against the Ogoni people, who were opposing 
oil exploration in their territory during the 1990s. By the time of publication, 
the US Supreme Court will have determined whether the ATS, which allows 
lawsuits in the US for violation of international law, also creates a legal basis 
for suits against corporations. 
 Part D considers the challenges to enforcement against corporations, 
at national level, of breaches of human rights norms. In addition, 
consideration is given to policy options to facilitate coordinated approach, 
drawing on the example of corporate criminal liability. 
                                                
3 Chris Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the 
Promotion of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 56, 58 (“Texaco operated for years 
in the Amazon as […] a state unto itself, with annual earnings four times the size of 
Ecuador’s GNP”).  
4 Kiobel v Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co. 621F.3d.11 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010). 
5 Transcript of Oral Arguments, US Supreme Court, February 28, 2012, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf.  
6 28 US Code &1350. 
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B. THE CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES UNDERPINNING THE NOTION OF 
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
 
1. CATEGORIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY NRCS 
This section suggests that, while it is possible to identify a consistent pattern 
of ‘human rights-type abuses’ committed by NRCs, there are conceptual 
difficulties in holding corporations liable for violating international human 
rights norms. 
 Despite longstanding and unresolved debate about whether 
corporations could be the ‘subjects’ of international law and which specific 
rights pertain to business activities, the fact that corporations have become 
participants in the international legal system with the capacity to bear both 
rights and duties has reached international consensus. However, whilst 
corporations may have, in theory, the ability to impact the full range of 
human rights, some norms appear to be at a greater risk in the operating 
context of NRCs, such as the right to life or fair trial (in cases where vested 
interests with the host government expose NRCs to increased risks of aiding 
and abetting local police or armed forces in containing resistance to their 
operations), or the right to a sound environment or collective rights to 
determine how natural resources should be protected. 
 Tar sands activities in Canada have been described as one of the 
world’s biggest environmental disaster, turning vast carbon sinks into the 
largest emitters of carbon dioxide on the planet.7 New exploration methods 
addressing increased global oil demand (including gas shale exploitation in 
the US or the granting of hydraulic fracturing licenses in the UK), together 
with the building of processing facilities and pipelines associated with oil 
development mean that oil companies are possibly more prone to negatively 
impacting the environment and disrupting communities surrounding their 
operations. The granting of exploration licenses and the negotiation of 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with host States may also result in 
difficult issues of consent in relation to land access and resettlement of local 
stakeholders. Indigenous peoples do not always welcome the investment of 
oil multinationals. This is despite the potential of these investments to bring 
                                                
7  Steven Weissman, The Berkeley Blog (24 June 2010), available at 
http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2010/06/24/alberta%E2%80%99s-tar-sands-a-slow-motion-
equivalent-of-the-gulf-disaster/.  
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economic and social opportunities. Local communities may perceive these 
developments as incompatible with their aspirations and traditional values.8  
 The magnitude of revenues that oil projects constitute for host States 
also means that legal arrangements between oil corporations and host 
governments are often based on compromise. In the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) Pipeline project, the freezing effect of the ‘non-interference’ 
provision in the Host Government Agreement (HGA)9 between the BP 
consortium and the Turkish Government prevents Turkey from intervening 
in key areas of the project, including land rights and environment, except in 
extreme circumstances. The high threshold for State intervention set in the 
HGA might conflict with the state duty to protect fundamental human 
rights.10 It is also frequent for contractual arrangements with host states to 
transfer responsibility for maintaining security issues to corporations. In 
certain circumstances, this has meant that the containment of protest by 
security forces has resulted in host states being accused of violating human 
rights norms, including unlawful detention and torture. In such instances, 
corporations have been sued for complicity with state organs. 
 
2. NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS AND POLICY 
INCOHERENCE 
With the exception of US legislation, which provides for a civil cause of 
action directly associated with the violation of human rights norms under the 
ATS, no other legislation allows victims to obtain redress directly for 
violations of human rights per se. The ‘human rights litigation’ label is 
somewhat misleading, since far from dealing with violation of international 
norms as reflected in custom and treaties, cases against NRCs are typically 
concerned with providing civil remedies to the victims, whose main concern 
is to obtain compensation from defendant corporations for physical injury 
and property damage caused by negligence or foresight. 11  However, 
domestic laws governing corporate activities (e.g. corporate, investment law) 
                                                
8 Deanna Kemp and others, ‘Just relations and company-community conflict in mining’ 
(2011) 101 Journal of Business Ethics 93. 
9 HGA, Article 5 (“Government Guarantees”). 
10  Catherine Redgwell, ‘Contractual and Treaty Arrangements Supporting Large 
European. Transboundary Projects: Can adequate Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection be secured?’ in Energy Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in 
Changing Markets (OUP 2012) 106-108. 
11 Richard Meeran, ‘Tort litigation against multinationals for violation of human rights: an 
overview of the position outside the US’ (2001) Vol 3:1 City University of Hong Kong 
Law Review 1. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
 
 205 
and their liability, essentially civil and criminal law, do not necessarily 
pursue the protection of human rights norms. Host states might be tied to 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BITs’) offering investors guarantees of 
fairness and equitable treatment with little regard to their duty to protect 
human rights. Similar concerns have been raised about the lack of 
alignment12 between government agencies promoting foreign investment and 
other departments in charge of implementing human rights obligations. 
What has generally been termed as “horizontal incoherence” 13  creates 
difficulties in holding corporations liable under national law for their 
violation of international norms. 
 
3. ARE CORPORATIONS THE PRIMARY BEARERS IN RELATION TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORMS? 
The question as to whether human rights obligations are only owed by State 
entities remains a controversial and developing field. The UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights14 (‘the Norms’) go beyond the 
classical view that the primary duty to ensure that corporations respect 
human rights lies with states. Other instruments such as voluntary initiatives 
like the UN Global Compact15 or soft law instruments like the OECD 
Guidelines16 seek to engage corporations in observing minimum standards of 
protection in certain fields, including human rights and environmental 
protection. However, none of these instruments have succeeded in creating 
generally applicable international law obligations.  
 The premise of the Norms, i.e. that corporations have greater power 
than states to affect the realization of human rights and should bear direct 
responsibility for the rights they impact, was probably going too far in 
shifting the burden of responsibility from sovereign states to private entities. 
                                                
12 UNHRC, Eighth Session ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights’ (7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, paras 39-41. 
13 Horizontal incoherence generally occurs when certain government bodies, often in the 
context of host States concerned of attracting foreign investment, work at cross-purposes 
with State’s human rights obligations and those in charge of implementing them. See (n 
12), paras 33-38. 
14 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 22nd Meeting 
13 August 2003 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12.  
15 See United Nations, ‘Global Compact’, available at www.unglobalcompact.org. 
16  OECD, ‘Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2011 edition) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.  
Corporate Liability for Breach of Human Rights 
 
 206 
The challenges faced by the Norms in imposing international law obligations 
on corporations have also re-emphasised the conceptual difficulty of 
positioning corporations in the web of international obligations, despite the 
cross-border nature of multinational companies’ operations.     
The main argument against imposing international human rights 
obligations on corporations is that juridical entities should not be allowed to 
take over the role of states to protect human rights. Where state authority is 
weak, it is feared that a transfer of duties to corporations to protect human 
rights may further erode political impetus to fulfil state obligations17. This 
approach has been formulated in the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights18 (the ‘Guiding Principles’) to implement the 
“Protect, Respect and Remedies” Framework19 first introduced in 2008 by 
the UN Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Professor 
John Ruggie (the ‘SRSG’). The Guiding Principles distinguish between the 
“state duty to protect” against third party abuse and the “responsibility of 
companies to respect human rights”. They possibly constitute the most 
authoritative international statement to date regarding corporate 
responsibilities, although controversy remains as to whether corporations 
could not, as a matter of principle, have direct obligations under international 
law, despite the lack of obvious remedies to hold them accountable.20  
 
4. THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE UNDERLYING NORMS 
Environmental degradation constitutes a central allegation in cases against 
energy companies. For instance, in the Shell Oruma case21, residents in the 
Niger delta filed civil suits in The Hague against Shell’s Netherlands-based 
parent, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, and its Nigerian subsidiary, SPDC, in relation 
to oil pollution associated to SPDC operations. Moreover, in the Trafigura 
                                                
17 Philip Alston, ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights 
Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?’ in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and 
Human Rights (OUP 2005) 3. 
18 UNHRC, Seventeenth Session ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (21 March 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 endorsed at the UN Human Rights Council 11th Session 
(16 June 2011). 
19 UNHRC (n 12). 
20 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 195-
252. 
21 Court of The Hague, Judgment in motion contesting jurisdiction of 30 December 2009, 
Case No 330891/HA ZA 09-579. 
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case22, Ivory Coast citizens brought suits against Trafigura, one of the 
world’s largest oil trading companies, concerning the disposal of hazardous 
waste in Abidjan. Lawsuits were filed in the Netherlands against the parent 
company, Trafigura Beheer. Claims were also filed in the UK against the 
British subsidiary responsible for the company’s operations, as well as in the 
Ivory Coast, where claims based in tort were filed23. In Carijano24, members 
of the Peruvian Achuar indigenous group revived a tort claim against 
Occidental Petroleum for land contamination and adverse health effects 
resulting from Occidental’s operations in the Amazon forest. 
 The way the abovementioned cases approach environmental rights is 
essentially anthropocentric: environmental rights are seen as merely deriving 
from the ‘greening’ of existing human rights of the so-called first generation, 
such as the right to life and the right to property25, while the focus in 
establishing corporate liability is primarily on the harmful impact on 
individual humans, rather than the impact on the environment itself. Whether 
domestic law is able to transcend this anthropocentric approach to corporate 
liability in favour of a more eco-centric one might well depend on the ability 
of international law to formulate and recognize a right to a ‘decent’ or 
‘satisfactory environment’. So far, despite the reference at regional level to a 
“general satisfactory environment”26 and the decision in the Onigoland 
case27 to place substantive environmental obligations on states, the legal 
foundations of such a right in an instrument of worldwide applicability 
remain questionable.28  
 The difficulty to achieve a normative status extends, in fact, to the 
vast majority of ‘collective’ or third generation rights29. The reluctance to 
accept them as real rights is often justified by their broad formulation as 
objectives that the international community is seeking to pursue, or mere 
                                                
22 Yao Essaie Motto & Others v (1) Trafigura Limited & (2) Trafigura Beheer BV [2011] 
EWCA Civ 1150. 
23 Yao Essaie Motto and Ors v Trafigura Ltd & Trafigura Beheer [2009] High Court, 
Case No HQ06XO3370/42. 
24 Carijano v Occidental Petroleum Co, (9th Cir. March 3, 2010), No. 08-56187. 
25 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ (2007) 18 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 471. 
26 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into 
force 21 October 1986), (1982) 21 ILM 58, Article 24. 
27 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm.No. 
155/96 (2001). 
28 Boyle (n 25) 504-511. 
29 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (OUP 2003) 54-
60. 
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principles already enunciated in the UN Charter (e.g. peace and security, 
right to development). 
 Another example of the normative uncertainty of the rights likely to 
be affected by NRC operations can be illustrated by the debate of recent 
years regarding the rights of indigenous peoples. The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’)30 recognizes 
that indigenous peoples have a right “to determine and develop strategies for 
exercising their right to development”.31 Their right to a healthy environment 
is set out in Article 29, which refers to “[…] the protection of the 
environment and the productive capacity of [peoples’] lands […] and 
resources”. The Declaration is not binding international law. It also took 
until 2010 for the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to announce 
their support of the Declaration. At the same time, there are strong 
arguments to support its normative status. Indigenous rights to participate in 
resource development are strongly rooted in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (herein ‘ICCPR’)32 and, in particular, in the right 
to self-determination.33 In a case where the granting of mining licenses had 
resulted in indigenous communities being dispossessed of their land, the 
South African Constitutional Court found that the ‘right to land’ was a right 
of “communal ownership under indigenous law”. 34 Such interpretation of 
indigenous rights by domestic courts also means that, although the primary 
responsibility to gain community consent under UNDRIP is on 
governments, the failure of NRCs to comply with indigenous consultation 
rights might expose NRCs to increased litigation. 
C. THE CHALLENGES POSED TO CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN THE REVIEW OF KIOBEL 
BEFORE THE US SUPREME COURT 
 
1. NRCS LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS  
The ATS grants US federal courts jurisdiction for “any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of the nations or a 
                                                
30 UNGA Res 61/295 (13 September 2007). 
31 African Charter (n 26) Art 23.  
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Articles 26/27. 
33 ICCPR Art 1(2); James Anaya, Indigenous People in International Law (OUP 1996) 
75-77. 
34 Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community [2003] AUIndigLawRpr 41; (2003) 8(3) 
Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 55, 2-3. 
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treaty of the United Sates”.35 Its primary function is to provide civil liability 
for noxious conduct in violation of international law. 
 So far, the vast majority of cases against NRCs for alleged violation 
of human rights norms have been brought in US courts under the ATS.36 
This is not surprising, given the jurisdictional advantages offered by the 
broad wording of the statute itself, the large number of NRCs incorporated 
or headquartered in the US and the fact that civil law jurisdictions generally 
do not provide for class actions.37 
 In the Unocal38 case, Burmese nationals alleged that Unocal aided and 
abetted the Myanmar military in subjecting them to forced labour, murder, 
rape and torture, in relation with the construction of the Yadana pipeline. In 
the Presbyterian Church of Sudan case, Talisman Energy, the multinational 
oil company headquartered in Calgary, Canada, was sued for aiding and 
abetting genocide in Sudan.39 Complicity with state authorities was also the 
focal point in Bowoto40, a case where Chevron’s subsidiary in Nigeria was 
accused of being complicit in human rights abuses when security forces 
contracted by Chevron fired at staff protesting against Chevron’s drilling 
activities at an offshore platform. 
 A remarkable feature of ATS litigation against NRCs is that 
corporations are sued as ‘secondary’ perpetrators of international crime. 
Most cases concern situations where corporations are accused of complicity 
in governmental violations of international law. Despite the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal’s observations in Unocal41 that certain crimes “do not 
require State action when they are committed in furtherance of other crimes 
such as […] genocide or war crimes for ATS liability to attach”, state 
intervention has been a consistent feature of ATS jurisprudence.  
 The requirement of state intervention raises the issue as to whether US 
courts regard the ATS as an instrument to promote corporate accountability 
for human rights abuses or, rather, to pursue US foreign objectives in 
democratic terms. In the Bhopal litigation, where Union Carbide, the New 
York-based parent of the Indian subsidiary involved in the environmental 
                                                
35 US Code (n 6). 
36 Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (OUP 2004), 
146-154. 
37 Meeran (n 11) 15. 
38 John Doe I v UNOCAL Corp, 395F. 3d 932 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), para 3. 
39 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc, No. 07-0016 (2nd Cir. Oct. 2, 
2009). 
40 Larry Bowoto et al v Chevron Texaco Corp, No. 09-15641 (9th Cir. Sep.17, 2010). 
41 John Doe (n 38) para 3. 
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tragedy, was the ‘primary’ perpetrator of the alleged offences, the courts 
refused to adjudicate the case.42 Arguably, accepting jurisdiction would have 
suggested that the Indian legal system was inappropriate to deal with the 
dispute, which would have caused a political storm, given that India has one 
of the world’s largest democracies. On the other hand, US courts have been 
happy to become involved with complicity allegations in Sudan, Nigeria or 
Burma. 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF THE KIOBEL CASE 
In a controversial opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kiobel 
concluded by majority (the ‘Kiobel majority’) that corporations could not be 
sued under the ATS for violation of international law, since no corporation 
had “ever been subject to any form of liability (whether civil or criminal) 
under customary international law”. 43  The fact that liability under 
international law was limited to natural, as opposed to juridical, persons led 
the court to conclude that “imposing liability on corporations for violation of 
customary international law [had] not attained a discernible, much less 
universal, acceptance among nations”.44 Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim 
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 The Supreme Court decision, to hear the plaintiffs’ appeal on 17 
October 2011 is likely to have a major effect on the future of US litigation 
against corporations for extraterritorial human rights impacts and, more 
generally, on the notion of corporate liability for human rights abuses. The 
central question put to the Supreme Court in the plaintiffs’ petition was 
“whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the 
law of the nations […] or if corporations may be sued in the same manner as 
any other private party under the ATS”.45 However, the controversy on 
corporate liability refocused on the issue of extraterritoriality following the 
hearing of 28 February 2012, when the Court asked the parties to submit 
supplemental briefs for a second hearing on “whether the ATS allows court 
to recognize a cause of action for violation of international law within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the US”.46   
                                                
42 Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 
842 (Southern District of New York Court May 12,1986). 
43 Kiobel (n 4) 2. 
44 Ibid, Judge Cabranes, 43. 
45 Petition for writ of certiorari, 6 June 2011, 2. 
46 Order of 5 March 2012. 
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 While the focus on corporate complicity has so far maintained a 
compromise in ATS litigation against NRCs between motives of enhanced 
corporate accountability and wider policy issues, Kiobel is unprecedented in 
the way it reopens the debate on the legal basis of corporate liability claims 
for breach of international norms. This section aims to explore the key 
arguments in the Kiobel controversy. 
 
3. KEY ARGUMENTS REVIEW 
 
(a)   Whether corporate responsibility for breach of international norms 
is a domestic or international law notion   
Kiobel turns on two different visions of what determines corporate 
responsibility for breach of international standards. For the respondents, 
Shell in this case, the question of ‘who’ may be liable under the ATS is a 
question of international law47, leaving to individual nations the power to 
decide ‘whether’ and ‘how’ to respond to a violation of international norms. 
By contrast, the petitioners point to the broader power of states to enact 
norms of responsibility as a matter of domestic law.48 The question of ‘who’ 
may be liable becomes essentially a question of domestic enforcement or 
remedy. The court was clearly split on the issue, with Justice Kagan 
asserting that “the question of who can be sued is a remedial question”49 and 
Chief Justice Roberts observing that “under international law, it is critically 
pertinent to [determine] who is undertaking the conduct that is alleged to 
violate international norms […] Governmental torture violates international 
norms. Private conduct does not.”50  
 
(b) Whether international law recognises a norm of corporate    
responsibility for breach of human rights norms alleged 
(i)    The test in Sosa51 and its interpretation by the Kiobel majority.  
To address the question whether or not international law recognizes a norm 
of corporate responsibility for breach of human rights norms alleged, the 
Kiobel majority took a ‘norm by norm’ approach, considering each violation 
of human rights alleged in the case, relying on the narrow test established in 
                                                
47 Brief For Respondents, 27 January 2012, 18. 
48 Brief For Petitioners, 14 December 2011, 12-17. 
49 Oral Arguments (n 5) 37. 
50 Ibid (n 5) 21. 
51 Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (9th Cir. June 29, 2004). 
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Sosa, where the Supreme Court constrained the type of violation of 
international law that could trigger the ATS jurisdiction.  
 Interpreting the ATS from an historical perspective and relying on the 
narrow ambit of the “violations of the law of the nation” that qualified when 
the statute was enacted in 1789, namely piracy and infringement of the rights 
of ambassadors, the court in Sosa formulated a twofold test, that some have 
characterized as setting a “very high bar for new causes of action to 
surmount”.52 Firstly, the court observed that “federal courts should not 
recognize private claims under federal law for violations of any international 
law with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than 
the historical paradigms familiar when the ATS was enacted”.53 Secondly, 
the court provided guidance to determine whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action stating, at footnote 20 of the opinion, 
that such determination requires a “related consideration of whether 
international law extends the scope of liability of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued if the perpetrator is a private actor such as a 
corporation or an individual”.54 
 The Kiobel majority and subsequent briefs in support of the 
respondents rely on this “related consideration”, first to justify the broad 
principle that corporate liability under the ATS derives from international 
law, then to assess whether customary international law has recognised 
liability for corporation for the alleged violation of the specific norms in 
question.  
 The approach of the Kiobel majority is remarkable from various 
perspectives: firstly, the justification of such a decisive principle is focused 
on a footnote of a prior Supreme Court opinion that dealt with the liability of 
natural as opposed to juridical persons. More importantly, the judiciary 
showed its determination to make a pronouncement on an ongoing and 
unresolved legal debate about which human rights norms apply to 
corporations and on what basis. In assessing whether torture or genocide by 
private actors violate international law, the Kiobel majority took the “related 
consideration” in Sosa a step further, by no longer distinguishing 
perpetrators between state and non-state actors but, instead, between 
corporations and natural persons, concluding that no sufficient consensus 
                                                
52  David Scheffer and Caroline Kaeb, ‘The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: the 
Resiliency of Corporate Liability under the ATS and the Case for a Counter Attack 
Strategy in Compliance Theory’ (2011) 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 334, 341. 
53 Sosa (n 51), Justice Souter, 38.  
54 Ibid, footnote 20, 38.  
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exists in international law that the alleged offenses (i.e. torture and genocide) 
can be committed directly by corporations.55  
 
(ii) The sources considered by the respondents in applying the Sosa test.  
Various sources are used to assess whether corporate liability for violation of 
international human rights has reached the status of customary international 
law.  
 Reference is made to the international human rights instruments such 
as the Convention Against Torture (‘CAT’), which is interpreted as 
contemplating only liability of individuals56. International human rights 
treaties are generally viewed as imposing obligations on nations to protect 
the rights of individuals, but not on corporations57. 
 Some Briefs in support of the defendant also refer to the statute of 
international criminal courts pointing to the limitation of the jurisdiction of 
the international criminal tribunals from post-war Nuremberg to the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’)58 to natural persons. It is also argued 
that the trials conducted at Nuremberg by the International Military Tribunal 
(‘IMT’) did not charge any corporation with human rights violations.59 
Scheffer, in contrast, discounts the exclusion of corporations from the 
court’s jurisdiction as resulting from the concern of complementarity, the 
fact that ICC jurisdiction should mirror that of domestic tribunals, since the 
ICC was created as a fallback option, and, finally, the fact that, at the time of 
enacting the Rome Statute in 1998, many nations had not acknowledged 
corporate criminal liability.60  
 In Kiobel, the distinction made in the jurisdiction of international 
criminal tribunals between individuals and corporations plays a central role 
to assess corporate liability as a norm of customary international law. It is 
clear that there is a subtle connection between the two notions, but one might 
wonder to what extent the fact that corporations cannot be held liable under 
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56 UNGA ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
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57 Chevron Amicus Brief in support of Respondents, 3 February 2012, 18. 
58 See Rome Statute Art 25(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; International Criminal 
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the ICC means that the underlying norm (i.e. genocide or crime against 
humanity) does not apply to these entities. While the limitations imposed on 
international criminal tribunals to prosecute natural rather than legal persons 
highlights the highly controversial debate about introducing criminal liability 
for corporations, it might be stretching the reasoning slightly too far to 
conclude that legal persons are immune from liability at national law for 
violating the norms in question. 
 
(c) Whether the exercise of universal jurisdiction in civil matters is 
conform with international law 
The extraterritoriality controversy in Kiobel illustrates the legal debate over 
when the protection of human rights justifies extraterritoriality. The briefs in 
support of the plaintiffs largely embrace the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, on the basis that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over 
private actors who have allegedly committed serious human rights abuses, 
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or whether the harm occurred 
in or outside the US. The debate however, demonstrates how unclear it is 
whether the principle actually extends to juridical persons. The case is also 
representative of the tension between the classical international law tenet of 
non-intervention in other states’ internal affairs and the values generally 
promoted by the entire human rights regime. 
 A central controversy in Kiobel relates to the “exercise of universal 
civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial abuses to which the nation has 
no connection”.61 After all, Kiobel concerns a claim by Nigerian citizens 
alleging that Royal Dutch Shell, an Anglo-Dutch multinational 
headquartered in The Hague aided and abetted human rights violations 
committed by the Abacha government in Nigeria. It is correct that the ATS 
constitutes a unique way of enforcing international law with no equivalent 
outside the US, which also explains why so many lawsuits have been 
brought against energy companies in the US for breach of human rights 
norms.  
 
(i) Extraterritoriality and international law 
The broad extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised under the ATS is described 
as an oddity “contrary to international law”.62 Reference is made to the 
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separate opinion in DRC v Belgium63 where three ICJ judgesrecalled the lack 
of international consensus concerning “[this] unilateral exercise of the 
function of guardian of international values”.64 Shell’s supporters regard 
universal jurisdiction as contrary to the international law principle of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, by which “any restriction of a nation’s jurisdiction 
from external sources would imply a diminution of its sovereignty”.65  
 The imposition of civil liability is also regarded as an “intrusion” on 
State sovereignty by the Obama administration, which filed a supplemental 
amicus briefin partial support of Shell, calling for significant restrictions on 
the application of the ATS.66 The arguments of the US government are tied 
to the factual circumstances of Kiobel, but also stress the risks of 
international frictions, where allegations of breach of human rights involve 
sovereign states. The US administration observes: “although the petitioners’ 
suit is against private corporations, adjudication of the suit would necessarily 
entail a determination about whether the Nigerian government has 
transgressed limits imposed by international law”.67 Likewise, the BP brief 
warns against the potential for ATS suits to constitute an “unlawful 
infringement”68 of sovereignty. Holding Shell liable for aiding and abetting 
acts allegedly committed by the Nigerian government within Nigeria is thus 
seen as a indirect way to litigate the conduct of a foreign government that 
would otherwise be immune from direct suit under broader principles of 
state immunity.69 
 While the US supplemental brief has attracted criticism among 
supporters of human rights accountability70, blaming Western governments 
for resisting accusations of human rights violations, one should recall that 
the foreign policy concerns put forward by the US government are based on 
broader public and constitutional principles, which limit the authority of the 
judiciary to assess conflicting policy matters implicated by lawsuits. The BP 
brief touches on such constitutional issues, raising awareness of the 
                                                
63Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
(Judgment), 14 February 2002, [2002] I.C.J Rep, 3.  
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“problem of expanding the scope of ATS liability turning federal courts into 
international civil courts to remedy wrong committed elsewhere”.71 
 
(ii) Extraterritoriality and statutory interpretation 
In the end, whether the ATS applies to extraterritorial conduct outside the 
US becomes a pure exercise of statutory interpretation since the ATS is 
silent on the matter. A narrow interpretation consists in examining the 
original purpose of Congress when the statute was enacted. At that time, the 
objective was “to ease diplomatic frictions caused by the inadequacy of State 
law remedies”72 by providing “redress for violations of international law that 
threatened serious consequences in international affairs of the US”.73 The 
ATS was after all enacted to provide remedies for torts committed against 
aliens on US soil or on the high seas, which are by essence outside territorial 
jurisdiction. This interpretation of the ATS is illustrated in the BP brief, 
which examines the wording of the statute, concluding that nothing in the 
terms ‘alien’ or ‘violation of the law of the nations’, suggests that Nigerian 
citizens can seek relief in US court for harm committed in Nigeria.  
 The debate on extraterritorial application of the ATS is endless. In 
Sarei v Rio Tinto74, a case involving a similar pattern of claims to the one in 
Kiobel, with Papua New Guineans suing a British-Australian mining 
company for wrongs committed in Papua New Guinea, the Ninth Circuit’s 
court held instead that the ATS applied to torts that occurred in foreign 
nations even if the alleged tort was committed by a corporation with no 
connection to the US. However, Judge Kleinfeld, in a dissent from the 
court’s order, suggested that “the point of the ATS was to keep the US out of 
international disputes, not to inject the US into them”75, concluding: “I 
suspect that we lack jurisdiction because both the case involves a political 
question and because we lack subject matter jurisdiction on account of 
extraterritoriality”.76 
 
(iii) Extraterritoriality and politics 
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There is also a political dimension in the attempt by some governments to 
undermine the extraterritorial application of the ATS. 77  Scholars have 
suggested that the involvement of the coalition of Australian Prime Minister 
Howard “in the Bush Administration campaign to restrict jurisdiction of the 
ATS” was related to the government’s “general opposition to the linking of 
trade and investment with human rights”.78 To date, Australia has not filed a 
brief to challenge jurisdiction in Kiobel, but one should not discount political 
factors influencing those who oppose the extraterritorial effects of national 
law in human rights litigation. The filing of briefs in support of the 
respondent by countries with substantial investments in oil and gas 
exploration worldwide, such as the UK and the Netherlands, is no 
coincidence. Not only would extended principles of extraterritoriality put 
their national industry at risk of increased litigation for human rights abuses, 
but they would also raise issues regarding the role of these countries in 
narrowing the governance gaps in countries endowed with huge oil and gas 
reserves. 
 
(d) Whether corporations may be found liable for violation of 
customary international law under aiding and abetting theory of 
liability and, if so, which test of complicity should apply  
Shell and its supporters finally dispute a long-standing assumption under the 
ATS litigation, namely, whether aiding and abetting constitutes a proper 
theory of liability.79 It is argued that federal law should not recognize a 
private right of action for aiding and abetting a foreign state’s violation of 
human right norms. By acknowledging such a cause of action, it is feared 
that courts adjudicating in alleged human rights abuses by private actors 
might indirectly create diplomatic tensions and interfere with foreign states’ 
domestic affairs. 
 The controversy then focuses on which standard of proof should apply 
to establish aiding and abetting liability. Shell elaborates on the high 
standard of the Second Circuit’s earlier decision in Talisman, which held 
that corporations could only be found liable under aiding and abetting theory 
if they provided ‘substantial assistance’ to the primary perpetrator with the 
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‘intent’ (rather than mere ‘knowledge’) of furthering the human right 
violation in question.  
 An interesting feature of the Kiobel debate concerning whether 
‘knowledge’ rather than ‘intent’ should apply to accessory corporate liability 
is where, and on what grounds, the parties chose to locate the legal source 
for establishing such standard. The fundamental divide is between sourcing 
the liability standard in international law80, in line with the Talisman 
decision, namely in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, or rather under 
domestic law, as favoured by the plaintiffs. The disagreement over the 
source for liability is a permanent feature of the Kiobel litigation. The 
starting point of corporate liability supporters is that international law 
defines primary violations actionable under the ATS, whilst it is federal law 
that determines the liability standard for complicity. On the other hand, Shell 
relies on Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which provides that “…[a] 
person shall be criminally responsible …for a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court…if that person …for the purpose of [emphasis added] 
facilitating the commission of such crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in 
its commission…”, in order to infer the applicable liability standard as being 
one of ‘intent’ rather than ‘knowledge’. 
 The purpose of this paper is not to provide an answer to such divisive 
debate about sourcing the norms of conduct applicable to the ATS, or the 
liability standard applicable to corporation that allegedly violates human 
rights norms, or the range of available remedies, but rather to highlight the 
level of complexity supporting the respective parties’ views. Scheffer, who 
headed the US delegation in the negotiation of the Rome Statute, disputes 
the fact that Article 25(3)(c) reflects customary international law. He points 
instead to the very circumstances of the Rome Statute negotiations to recall 
that Article 25(3)(c) was the result of “a negotiated compromise”81 between 
common law and civil law governments after years of protracted 
negotiations. Observing that the wording of Article 25(3)(c) was “uniquely 
crafted for the ICC”, he concludes that only ICC judges are entitled to 
interpret the meaning of the ‘purpose’ requirement under Article 25(3)(c).82 
In the meantime, and in order to determine the standard for aiding and 
abetting liability under the ATS, Scheffer suggests drawing upon the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals. In cases against the Former 
Yugoslav Republic and Rwanda, it was established that ‘knowledge’ was the 
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only standard to prosecute individuals for aiding and abetting the 
commission of atrocities.83 Other scholars, like Eser, have instead favoured a 
narrower interpretation of Article 25(3)(c), which requires an ‘intention’ on 
the part of the aider and abettor to join the commission of the crime in 
question.84 
 From a more pragmatic perspective, one might also argue that in the 
context of oil multinationals, which often operate in joint ventures with host 
governments, an ‘intention’-based standard might ensure that their 
subsidiaries do not face claims solely on the basis of incidental contacts with 
government officials accused of violating human rights norms.  
 One problematic issue illustrated in Kiobel (and earlier ATS cases like 
Unocal, in which the court found that “the standard for aiding and abetting 
under the ATS” was knowledge) is the extent to which the tests establishing 
accomplice corporate liability are consistently derived either from the ICC 
Statute or the jurisprudence of other international criminal tribunals. In other 
words, the ATS jurisprudence including Kiobel seems to rely exclusively on 
the use of international criminal law to establish the parameters of corporate 
civil liability.  
 However, human rights abuses by NRCs do not necessarily require 
resorting to criminal remedies. Abuses arising from environmental incidents 
caused by oil spillage for instance, concern primarily the violation of so-
called ‘environmental rights’. Environmental law scholars have observed 
that Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration or international instruments 
such as the World Charter for Nature, provide some “justification for using 
criminal responsibility as a means of enforcing international environmental 
law”.85  However, it is also possible to resort to other legal bases for 
establishing corporate liability. For example, negligence standards may 
provide such opportunities in an environmental context. Likewise, principles 
of agency liability86 are particularly relevant in oil exploration contexts, in 
which oil corporations contracting with rig drilling companies are in a 
position to influence operations that may lead to human rights violations. 
 
4. THE LESSONS FROM KIOBEL 
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Whether the Supreme Court strikes down or severely limits the application 
of the ATS, the controversy in this case is significant of the limits facing US 
courts in adjudicating alleged corporate breach of international standards. 
While at the time it was enacted the ATS represented a “commitment to 
enforce the law of the nations”87, it seems that the statute has lost part of the 
reach required to capture the complexity of energy multinational operations 
worldwide and the diverse scope of their human rights footprint.  
 The potential implications of a complete rejection of corporate 
liability under the statute raise wider issues than the extent to which 
international norms apply to corporations. Kiobel concerns accountability 
and whether it is possible to argue that, although corporations do not 
necessarily have obligations under international law, mechanisms under 
national law should be engaged to hold them accountable for wrongdoings 
arising from breach of international norms.  
 Regardless of whether the ATS is viewed as a “mechanism to enforce 
international law” or a mere “peculiarity”88 of the US legal system, Kiobel 
raises critical questions about the role of domestic legal regimes in enforcing 
human rights norms. If corporate liability is only a question of substantive 
international law obligations, as the Kiobel majority suggests, there is a risk 
that a gap in corporate accountability will arise. As Justice Kaganobserved, 
various international conventions “prohibit certain acts but do not talk about 
the actors”.89 In such instances, where international law does not specify 
whether the norm in question can be violated by juridical entities, relying 
purely on international law might be problematic, at least from an 
accountability perspective.  
 While the Kiobel majority opposes the empowerment of domestic 
courts to impose liability for violation of international law as a matter of 
principle, this paper argues that even if some consensus was reached on this 
matter, the real challenge is the formulation of a coordinated approach to 
enforcement at national level.  
D. THE CHALLENGES OF ENFORCEMENT IN HOLDING CORPORATIONS 
LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
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1. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES  
(a) The enforcement framework suggested by the “Guiding Principles”  
Not long before the UN Human Rights Council’s endorsement of the 
Guiding Principles, the SRSG observed that “all national systems need to 
adopt a principled approach to the question of adjudicative extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, balancing the interests of claimant, defendant and States”.90 
This statement constitutes a strong encouragement for States in which many 
corporations are domiciled, to develop effective regulatory systems to 
address corporate liability for violation of international norms.  
 The Guiding Principles, per se, also provide strong support for the 
need for access to effective remedies by victims of human rights abuses. 
Guiding Principle 25 in particular requires states, “as part of their duty to 
protect against business-related human rights abuse [to] take appropriate 
steps to ensure…that when such abuses occur…those affected have access to 
effective remedy”.91  
 Whilst the Guiding Principles are not binding international law, there 
is some consensus that they are likely to influence national law and policy 
and inform domestic legal standards in jurisdictions around the world.92 
 
(b) The European Union approach to jurisdiction 
The Brussels I Regulation93 confers on courts of EU Member States the 
competence to adjudicate civil cases against corporations domiciled within 
the EU regardless of their nationality, of the place where the alleged harm 
occurred and of the nationality of the plaintiff.94 Domiciliation is defined by 
reference to the corporation’s “statutory seat” or “principal place of 
business”.95 The Regulation has been praised for its certainty96. Thus, whilst 
the US Supreme Court seeks, in Kiobel, to establish whether Shell, an 
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Anglo/Dutch corporation is a proper defendant under the ATS for alleged 
human rights violations in Nigeria, a European court would probably hold 
that it is not, on the basis of Brussels I. Ennerking correctly argues that the 
mandatory nature97 of the European regime theoretically “precludes any 
decline of jurisdiction by an EU Member State court”98 on the basis of forum 
non conveniens. Cases can now proceed against NRC parent companies 
domiciled in EU members States without the obstruction of forum non 
conveniens disputes.99  
 However, the issue of forum non conveniens remains alive in common 
law countries outside the EU.100 There, jurisdictional issues are often more 
complex and, as case law demonstrates, jurisdiction often depends on how 
courts are prepared to interpret these rules. Based on Brussels I, the Court of 
The Hague in the Shell Oruma case had mandatory jurisdiction over the 
Netherlands-based parent, Royal Dutch Shell Plc. However, Shell contended 
that the Dutch court lacked jurisdiction over SPDC, the Nigerian subsidiary, 
disputing the use by the plaintiffs of procedural principles under Dutch 
law101 to enable the joinder of SPDC to the Netherlands-based parent. The 
defendant’s central argument was that the plaintiffs had initiated claims 
against RDS on a “patently inadequate basis for the sole purpose of creating 
jurisdiction for SPDC”.102 However, the Dutch Court dismissed Shell’s 
claim, relying on a strict interpretation of Dutch civil procedure103 and 
concluding that the claims against the parent and the subsidiary were 
sufficiently connected (i.e. based on the “same complex facts in Nigeria”104) 
to grant jurisdiction to SPDC. 
 
                                                
97 The ECJ clarified in Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson and Ors [2005] QB 801 that 
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(c) National law obstacles to extend jurisdiction 
While the Brussels I framework points to some consensus around 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, provided that a nexus exists between the home 
state’s forum and the corporation accused of a human rights violation, 
initiatives to promulgate national laws that extend the extraterritorial reach 
of domestic courts remain limited. The initiative to extend the authority of 
Canadian Federal Courts to protect foreigners against a broad range of 
human rights violations, including environmental degradation and 
transboundary pollution by Canadian-based multinationals raised the 
expectations of corporate liability advocates.105 So far, however, the so-
called “Bill on CSR”106 presented to the Canadian Parliament in April 2009, 
has not been adopted. 
 
2. SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES 
There are at least three substantive challenges in terms of domestic 
enforcement in the context of corporate liability. 
 
(a) Establishing private rights of action 
Decisions to create private rights of action are generally questions left to the 
legislature. In the US, for instance, civil liability for torture is implemented 
in the Torture Victim Protection Act (‘TVPA’)107, which establishes a cause 
of action for victims of torture or extraterritorial killings.108  
 The wording of Article 2(a) TVPA, which refers to the liability of 
“individuals” has left some controversy as to whether the TVPA applies to 
corporations, although Joseph observes that courts have interpreted the term 
‘individual’ as “encompassing […] corporations”.109 
 
(b) Deducing corporate obligations from human rights norms  
The South African Constitution is remarkable in specifying that its Bill of 
Rights binds corporations as well as natural persons. 110  Even if the 
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obligation is further qualified by the “nature of the right” and “the nature of 
the duty imposed by the right”, unlike other countries where the application 
of the norms is not specified, the South African Constitution provides a 
secure ground for corporate liability for breach of human rights norms. 
Although some countries have passed legislation to affirm rights that are 
relevant in the debate on corporate liability (e.g. recent Peruvian law that 
guarantees indigenous peoples rights to free prior and informed consent to 
projects affecting their land111), it is not clear whether the South African 
model constitution, in clarifying who bears human rights obligations, has 
been adopted elsewhere. 
 
(c) Determining liability principles 
There is a deeply entrenched doctrine in corporate law that a corporation’s 
subsidiary is a body distinct from its parent company. Aimed to induce 
shareholders to invest, the doctrine has its foundations on the principle of 
‘limited liability’. This principle suggests that a parent company cannot be 
held liable for the acts of its subsidiary, which is a separate legal entity, 
subject to the laws of the host country (‘corporate veil’). In the Shell Oruma 
case, for instance, Shell relied on the ‘corporate veil’ in its defense.112 By 
contrast, the plaintiffs, relying on the Cape case as legal authority113, alleged 
that the Shell parent had breached its duty of care to the Nigerian farmers, 
since the parent had not “exercised its influence on and control over the 
subsidiary’s environmental policy to avoid the harm”.114 
 So far, at least in the UK, the ‘corporate veil’ doctrine remains 
anchored in the laws and there is no sign that the legislature will question 
this on human rights grounds. Whether a UK-based parent company can be 
held liable for the acts of its subsidiary remains in the hands of the judiciary. 
There are limited circumstances under which the ‘corporate veil’ will be 
pierced under English law. The courts have developed a concept of duty of 
care, whereby a parent company may incur liability where it owes a duty of 
care to the claimant.115 In the Lubbe v Cape case, the Court of Appeal asked 
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whether such duty existed where the parent exercised de facto control over 
the operations of the subsidiary and knew, through its directors, that those 
operations involved risks to the health of the workers employed by that 
subsidiary. Comments by Lord Bingham in the House of Lords judgment116 
suggest that, for a parent company to breach its duty of care, the parent must 
have failed to take action to reduce the risks associated with the subsidiary’s 
operations. In those circumstances, this meant a failure to ensure the 
observance of proper health and safety standards. More recently, the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Chandler v Cape PLC 117  is probably more 
significant, as it set specific parameters to deduce the liability of the parent 
company. The case involved a claim for asbestosis contracted as a 
consequence of poor working conditions in South Africa and the court 
allowed a case to be brought against the parent company in the UK. 
 
3. IS CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY THE WAY FORWARD? 
(a) The implementation of international crimes into national legislation 
As highlighted by the Norwegian multidisciplinary research foundation 
FAFO in a surveyconducted in sixteen jurisdictions, an increasing number of 
countries have incorporated the three crimes defined under the Rome 
Statute, namely crime against humanity, genocide and war crimes, into their 
domestic law.118 Also significant is the elimination of the jurisdictional 
limitation placed by Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute through domestic law. 
The survey observes that most countries no longer distinguish between 
natural and juridical persons in incorporating international crimes into 
domestic law.  
 Some countries have been strong supporters of corporate criminal 
liability. France, for instance, allowed corporations to be prosecuted for legal 
offences as early as 1994, introducing criminal sanctions and fines ranging 
from dissolution of the corporation to confiscation of corporate assets.119 
There are recognized advantages in holding corporations liable for criminal 
acts: enforcement measures and penalties are often more stringent than civil 
remedies and the stigma associated with criminal sanctions is regarded as 
having a more effective deterrent effect on future corporate wrongdoings. 
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 However, there are also important limitations and it is arguable that, 
as the current law stands, the scope for prosecution of NRCs for criminal 
acts, remains limited. Save for strict liability offences, proving the mental 
element of a crime for legal entities is required. One method of establishing 
the intention or recklessness of a legal entity is to use the ‘identification 
principle’, which requires attributing the intent of a crime to the ‘directing 
mind’ of the corporation (i.e. the directors or the senior management).120 
More liberal approaches require that a ‘corporate culture’ exists “within the 
body corporate”121 in question, with ‘corporate culture’ being defined in 
broad terms as “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct”.122 In any case, 
the attribution of intent is not obvious. There are also specific enforcement 
difficulties that make the conviction of corporations for violation of human 
rights norms technically impossible. For instance, under English law, while 
torture, genocide and crimes against humanity are criminal offences123, these 
crimes are only subject to custodial punishment. 124  Since corporations 
cannot be found liable for offences punishable by imprisonment125, it follows 
that corporations cannot be convicted for violation of these specific human 
rights norms.  
 Unsurprisingly, the Trafigura case did not result in any corporate 
criminal prosecution in the UK Courts. Instead, Ivorian plaintiffs brought a 
civil suit in the London High Court seeking compensation for the physical 
harm and property damages caused by the ‘Probo Koala’ incident. Criminal 
liability was only established for a limited number of individuals involved 
with the incident. Whilst the ‘Probo Koala’ captain and the Trafigura officer 
responsible for the discharge of the slops received suspended prison 
sentences, respectively of five and six months in Dutch courts126, the most 
serious sentence - 20-year imprisonment - was imposed by an Abidjan court 
on the owner of the company contracted for the disposal of the waste. 
Ironically, Trafigura’s main shareholder and founder remained insulated 
from criminal prosecution for leading the export of the waste to the Ivory 
Coast. 
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(b) Ecocide and the question of individual criminal liability 
The Trafigura case demonstrates the limitations of the current criminal legal 
regime to hold corporations accountable for violating human rights norms. 
The incorporation through domestic law of international crimes has so far 
been concentrated on the four “crimes against peace”, namely Genocide, 
Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes and Crimes of Aggression.127 At the 
international level, recent proposals to introduce ‘ecocide’ as a fifth crime 
against peace to address large scale destructions of ecosystems, including 
corporate activities associated with the depletion of natural resources, might 
be a way forward.128 The principle of complementarity under the Rome 
Statute would, in turn, exercise pressure on States to implement ecocide as a 
crime at national level. This possibility was ventilated in the mock ecocide 
trial held in London in September 2011.129 However, the effectiveness of 
ecocide will depend on domestic enforcement. Corporations are fictional 
entities with decisions made by directors and senior management. If the 
purpose of corporate liability is to deter corporations from violating 
international norms, it is suggested that these individuals should be held 
liable individually. Whether liability should be directed at corporations or 
individuals raises the difficult question of responsibility allocation. The 
approach of the Australian Criminal Code, which relies on ‘corporate 
culture’, can be praised for its flexibility but, at the same time, the 
Nuremberg tribunals (arguably at the very heart of crimes against humanity) 
demonstrated that ‘systems’, only constitute the means by which individuals 
engage in criminal activities and therefore cannot provide the sole reason for 
attributing responsibility. 
E. CONCLUSION 
As Kiobel demonstrates, whether a principle of corporate liability for 
violation of human rights norms has materialized at international law 
remains largely unanswered. Whether the difficulty to find sources of 
international law that hold corporations liable for human rights abuses 
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justifies corporate impunity is another question. A complete rejection of 
corporate liability based on the indeterminacy of international standards 
defies common sense. The incorporation of charges for international crimes 
into domestic law following the ratification of the Rome Statute 
demonstrates the capacity of national legal systems to hold corporations 
accountable. However, relying on domestic law to determine the pathways 
for corporate accountability is not without challenge.  
 Public consensus is pushing for more international supervision in 
standard setting. Proposals range from international conventions on safety 
standards for oil platforms130 to treaties embracing broader corporate human 
rights obligations. 131  Such conventions are believed to help host 
governments resist the pressure of the oil industry to reduce regulatory 
supervision. These proposals however, overlook two problems. First, home 
states are not necessarily willing to expand principles of corporate 
accountability, as is evidenced by the current opposition of the US 
government in Kiobel to extend jurisdiction for corporate harms committed 
outside the US, or the caution of the Canadian Parliament to enact Bill C-
354.  
 Secondly, host states can be torn between the steps required to 
“strengthen domestic social and environmental standards”132 and to “ensure 
the effectiveness of judicial mechanisms”133on the one hand, and the threat 
of arbitration for violating guarantees under BITs on the other hand. There is 
a significant risk faced by host states to entertain litigation against large oil 
companies. Effectively, the host state may find itself conflicted between its 
duty to grant access to domestic judicial mechanisms and the risk that the oil 
company will later invoke the violation of a BIT between the host state and 
the state of the investor, arguing that the course of justice has been perverted 
in the domestic courts. The arbitration faced by Ecuador for allegedly failing 
to provide due process, whilst an Ecuadorian court issued a multi-billion 
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verdict demanding Chevron in February 2011, to fund environmental 
remediation for oil pollution, is an example of this sort of conflict.134 
 Growing concern regarding corporate impunity might generate further 
reform: mechanisms could be introduced into BITs to correct the “imbalance 
between investors’ rights and the State duty to protect human rights”135, 
ecocide might be adopted as a fifth crime against peace to address 
environmental degradation caused by NRCs, requirements for piercing the 
‘corporate veil’ could be harmonized across jurisdictions. However, reform 
is a complex and multi-faceted process. While the Human Rights Council 
has been urged to “establish a robust follow-on mechanism to build on the 
SRSG efforts”136, success might ultimately depend on the willingness of 
national legal systems to promote accountability mechanisms as a policy 
option. 
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